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Abstract
This paper reexamines the role of open market operations for
short-run e¤ects of monetary policy in a New Keynesian frame-
work. The central bank supplies money in exchange for securities
that are discounted with the short-run nominal interest rate, while
money demand is induced by a liquidity constraint. We allow for
a legal restriction by which only government bonds are eligible.
Their supply is bounded by scal policy that is assumed to be
Ricardian. If public debt is dominated in rate of return by private
debt, open market operations matter, and an endogenous liquidity
premium and a liquidity e¤ect arise. Nominal interest rate setting
(including a peg) is then associated with price level and equilib-
rium uniqueness, regardless whether prices are exible or set in a
staggered way. Thus, the legal restriction overcomes indetermina-
cies due to an unbounded money supply, as implied by the real
bills doctrine. Moreover, it facilitates constant money growth and
interest rate policy to be equivalent.
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Central banks in most industrial countries conduct monetary policy mainly via open market
operations, where money is supplied in exchange for risk free securities discounted with a
short-run nominal interest rate. Hence, the costs of cash acquisition depend on the current
discount rate and the availability of collateral. Monetary theory, however, has not reached a
consensus on the e¤ects of open market operations and even claims that they are irrelevant, as
for example shown by Wallace (1981) and Sargent and Smith (1987), or Eggerston and Wood-
ford (2003).3 In accordance with the latter view, the majority of recent contributions to the
monetary policy literature abstracts from an explicit specication of open market operations
and assumes that money is injected via lump-sum transfers. In this paper open market op-
erations are (re)introduced in a standard monetary business cycle framework and it is shown
that the relevance of open market operations depends on whether the set of eligible securities
is restricted or not. In particular, when only government bonds are accepted in open market
operations, the liquidity puzzle can be resolved and an endogenous liquidity premium on
non-eligible securities can be generated. Further, a binding legal restriction avoids price level
indeterminacy and equilibrium multiplicity that arise for interest rate policies accompanied
by an unbounded money supply and leads to an equivalence between simple money supply
and interest rate rules.
The analysis is conducted in an innite horizon model with identical households, which de-
mand money due to a liquidity constraint. Money is supplied in form of outright sales/purchases
and repurchase agreements, where money and interest bearing securities are exchanged. The
amount of money supplied in open market operations equals the discounted value of eligible
securities. Households can decide on whether to carry over money from one period to the
other or to repurchase the securities. The former corresponds to the conventional specication
of money, where it is treated as a store of value, while money that is held under repurchase
agreements serves as a pure medium of exchange. Households are indi¤erent between the
two types of money holdings, which allows to simplify the analysis by focussing on the case
where money is exclusively held under repurchase agreements.4 Households nancial wealth
comprises claims on other households and government bonds carried over from the previous
period. We explicitly take into account that real world central banks are typically character-
3Dupor (2001) examines the role of open market operations, which are specifed as holding scal policy
constant in the face of a government asset exchange (see Sargent and Smith, 1987). For this case, he shows
that open market operations are not irrelevant, since scal policy is non-Ricardian.
4This specication of money, which can be interpreted as inside money, relates to the one in Drèze and
Polemarchakis (2000) and Dubey and Geanakopolos (2003) and avoids Hahns (1965) paradox though money
is held over a nite horizon.
1ized by restrictions on their asset acquisition policy (see, e.g., Kopcke, 2002). In particular,
eligible securities are usually constrained to a set of assets with high credit quality in order to
avoid any credit risk in the central banks portfolio and opportunities for political pressure
to inuence the allocation of credit (see Meyer, 2001). The US Federal Reserve, for example,
exclusively accepts securities issued by the Treasury, federal agencies, as well as acceptances
and bank bills, which meet high credit quality standards (see Meulendyke, 1998). Recent
asset acquisition policy of the US Federal Reserve can even be summarized as Treasuries-
only (see Broaddus and Goodfriend, 2001). In the model, a legal restriction is imposed,
which constrains money supply in that only government bonds can be used in open market
operations. The crucial assumption is that households internalize not only the goods market
(cash-in-advance) constraint, but also this money market constraint when they decide on
their optimal plan. Then there exists a rational expectations equilibrium where private debt
yields a higher interest than public debt and the money market restriction is binding, such
that the outstanding stock of government bonds relates to the amount of money supplied in
open market operations and exhibits a liquidity value.5
In order to facilitate comparisons with the New Keynesian theory, which serves as the
predominant framework in the recent literature on monetary policy analysis, the model fur-
ther allows for prices to be set by monopolistically competitive (retail) rms in a staggered
w a y . W h e nt h e r ei sn ol e g a lr e s t r i c t i o no no p e nm a r k e to p e r a t i o n s ,t h er e d u c e ds e to fl i n -
earized equilibrium conditions is isomorphic to the standard New Keynesian model applied
in Clarida et al. (1999). In case there is a binding legal restriction on eligible securities, the
model exhibits substantial di¤erences. In particular, a monetary injection then reduces the
nominal discount rate regardless whether prices are exible or sticky. Hence, it generates the
liquidity e¤ect, for example, reported by Hamilton (1997) or Christiano et al. (1999), which
can hardly be reproduced by conventional sticky price models, where the nominal interest
rate tends to increase with money supply due to higher expected ination (see Christiano et
al., 1997). While it is known that this so-called liquidity puzzle can  at least temporarily
 be solved by allowing for segmentations and information asymmetries in asset markets (see
Lucas, 1990, Fuerst, 1992, and Alvarez et al., 2002), the emergence of the liquidity e¤ect
in this paper relies on the availability of eligible securities. Due to the assumption that the
issuance of public debt is constrained to ensure government solvency,6 ar i s ei nt h es u p p l yo f
money must necessarily be accompanied by a decline in its relative price, i.e., the nominal
5Liquidity or transaction services of government bonds are assumed in a more direct way in Bansal and
Coleman (1996), Canzoneri et al. (2000), or Lahiri and Vegh (2003).
6In other words, the sequence of tax receipts and, thus, public liabilities are restricted to induce a Ricardian
scal policy regime.
2discount (repo) rate. When prices are set in a staggered way, the model further predicts real
activity to increase and the spread between the interest rates on private and public debt to
decrease with a monetary expansion, if households are risk-averse. Hence, the spread can be
interpreted as a liquidity premium on non-eligible securities, contributing to the solution for
Weils (1989) r i s k - f r e er a t ep u z z l e  in the spirit of Bansal and Colemans (1996) explanation.
When the central bank is assumed to control the nominal discount (repo) rate, which
equals the interest rate on government bonds, the analysis discloses that well-known deter-
minacy properties of conventional models relate to the irrelevance of open market operations
therein. In particular, an interest rate peg accompanied by an unrestricted money supply
leaves (for exible prices) the price level and (for sticky prices) the rational expectations
equilibrium path indetermined, in accordance with the results of Kerr and King (1996) and
Benhabib et al. (2001). Hence, these ndings a¢rm that a monetary policy regime with no
e¤ective limit to the quantity of money, which can be interpreted as a central bank applying
the real bills doctrine (see Friedman and Schwartz, 1963), is prone to non-uniqueness of
prices and equilibria, as shown by Sargent and Wallace (1982), McCallum (1986), or Smith
(1988). On the other hand, if there is a binding legal restriction on the supply of money,
nominal interest rate policy is always associated with an uniquely determined price level and
an unique rational expectations equilibrium.7 In particular, equilibrium uniqueness does not
require the fulllment of the so-called Taylor-principle, as it would in the case where open
market operations are irrelevant (see Woodford, 2001), implying that the central bank can al-
ready stabilize the economy by setting the nominal interest rate rather than being compelled
to control the real interest rate. However, when the central bank sets the nominal interest
rate contingent on changes in ination, it should refrain from adjusting the interest rate in
an extreme way when debt interest payments are not completely tax nanced. Otherwise, it
would strongly burden public debt obligations, which  by interfering with interest rate policy
 might give rise to a divergent equilibrium path.8 Macroeconomic stability then requires
monetary policy to account for the evolution of public debt.
The stability analysis discloses another implication of the money market constraint, which
is concerned with the structural relations between interest rates, money supply, and ination.
Regarding the relation between money supply and the rate of ination, one would expect
sensible policy behavior to involve a negative value (see McCallum, 1999). According to
7Given that tax policy is assumed to ensure government solvency, these ndings do not relate to determinacy
results in Woodford (1994) or Benhabib et al. (2001) for the case where scal policy is specied in a non-
Ricardian way.
8The destabilizing e¤ect of aggressive interest rate policy via debt-interest spirals is also found by Leith
and Wren-Lewis (2000) in a framework where public debt is non-neutral due to overlapping generations.
3this view, a central bank that aims at stabilizing ination should implement a sequence of
money growth rates, which are negatively related to the sequence of ination rates, as for
example found by Ireland (2003) for the US Federal Reserve policy, whereas a positive relation
 indicating an accommodating money supply  does not seem to be consistent with this
aim. Within our theoretical framework, it is always possible to identify interest rate rules
that are associated with sequences of non-accommodating money growth rates. However,
without a legal restriction on money supply an interest rate policy that induces equilibrium
(multiplicity) determinacy is accompanied by a sequence of money growth rates, which are
(decreasing) increasing with ination. In contrast, if the legal restriction is binding a simple
equivalence principle applies, predicting that a central bank can use non-accommodating
money supply or interest rate rules interchangeably without a¤ecting determinacy or altering
the equilibrium sequences.9 Hence, a binding legal restriction on eligible securities in open
market operations allows a central bank to implement its money market rate target via a
limited supply of reserves and to switch between operating targets leaving the behavior of
macroeconomic aggregates unchanged.
The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model. In section 3 we
present results for the exible and sticky prices. Section 4 concludes and discusses some
further implications.
2 The model
Identical and innitely lived household-rm units are endowed with government bonds,
money, and claims on other households carried over from the previous period. They pro-
duce a wholesale good employing labor from all households. Aggregate uncertainty is due to
monetary policy shocks, which are realized at the beginning of the period. Then goods are
produced and asset markets open, where households can trade without restrictions. Money
demand is induced by assuming that purchases of consumption goods are restricted by a liq-
uidity constraint. The central bank supplies money exclusively via open market operations.
There, the supplied amount of money equals the discounted value of interest bearing assets,
which are deposited at the central bank.10 Then the goods market opens. After goods have
been traded, households can repurchase the securities from the central bank. The remaining
amount of money is carried over to the next period. To allow for a nominal rigidity, monop-
olistically competitive retail rms are introduced that di¤erentiate the wholesale goods and
9An analysis of a switch between operating targets in the context of a liquidity trap can be found in
Benhabib et al. (2002).
10Equivalently, it can be assumed that nancial intermediaries or traders engage in open market operations
on the behalf of the households.
4set their prices in a staggered way. As a consequence, the log-linear approximation of the
model nests the standard New Keynesian model presented in Clarida et al. (1999).
Households Lower (upper) case letters denote real (nominal) variables. There is an innite
number of time periods ! (! =0 "1"2"###). Let $! =( $0"####"$!) denote the history of events up
to date ! and %($!j$!¡1) denote probability of state $! and, thus, of the history $! conditional
on the history $!¡1 at date ! ¡ 1. The initial state, $0,i sg i v e ns ot h a t%($0)=1 . There is a
continuum of perfectly competitive household-rm units distributed uniformly over [0"1].I n
each period ! ah o u s e h o l d& 2 [0"1] consumes a composite good ’(&"$!) and supplies working
time ((&"$!)=
R 1
0 ("(&"$!))* to household-rm units, where ("(&"$!) denotes the working time






and sells the wholesale good to retail rms charging a price ,$($!_ ) per unit. Household & is
assumed to maximize the expected value of the discounted stream of utility stemming from





-!%($!) .(’(&"$!)"((&"$!))"- 2 (0"1)" (2)
where - denotes the subjective discount factor. The instantaneous utility function . is
assumed to be strictly increasing in consumption ’, strictly decreasing in working time (,
strictly concave, twice continuously di¤erentiable with respect to both arguments, satises
the usual Inada conditions, and is additively separable.
We separate the household problem into a intratemporal and an intertemporal part. In the
intratemporal part they make their optimal decisions on production and on the composition
of consumption. Prot maximizing leads to the following demand for labor (#(*"$!):
,($!)/($!)=,$($!)" (3)
where ,($!) denotes the aggregate price level and /($!) the real wage rate. Let ’(&"$!) be
consumption of a composite good which is dened as a CES aggregate of di¤erentiated goods







where 231 is the constant elasticity of substitution between any two retail goods. Let ,(1"$!)
denote the price of the retail good 0(1"$!) a n dt h ep r i c eo ft h ec o m p o s i t eg o o d,($!) be given
by ,($!)1¡& =
R 1
0 ,(1"$!)1¡&)1. Minimizing costs for purchasing a unit of the composite good







The intertemporal part unfolds as follows. In what follows the index & is  except for the
supply side variables  disregarded, for convenience, as households are identical. At the be-
ginning of period ! households are endowed with nancial wealth 4($!¡1), which comprises
government bonds holdings 5($!¡1), claims on other households 6($!¡1), and money holdings
7’($!¡1):4($!¡1)=5($!¡1)+6($!¡1)+7’($!¡1). Both interest bearing assets are as-
sumed to be nominally state contingent leading to a payo¤ in period ! equal to 8(($!)6($!¡1)
and 8($!)5($!¡1). This assumption is introduced, on the one hand, to deliver the conven-
tional specication of the consumption Euler equation. On the other, it will be responsible
for households to be indi¤erent between carrying over money from one period to the other
and holding money temporarily under repurchase agreements.11
Before agents trade in assets or goods, the aggregate shocks arrive, goods are produced,
and wages are credited on checkable accounts at nancial intermediaries. Then households
enter the assets market, where they can trade with other households and the treasury in an
unrestricted way. After the asset market is closed, households can participate in open market
operations, where they can exchange interest bearing assets 5)($!) for money additions 9($!).





Hence, the exchange (repo) rate in open market operations equals the gross nominal in-
terest rate on government bonds. The exchange restriction (5) is assumed to hold for two
t y p e so fo p e nm a r k e to p e r a t i o n s ,n a m e l yo u t r i g h ts a l e sa n dp u r c h a s e sa sw e l la sr e p u r c h a s e
agreements. The fraction of money traded via repurchase agreements, which is denoted by
7*($!), is only held until the end of the period, when the repurchase agreements are settled.
Hence, 7*($!) is a ow variable and can be interpreted as inside money, as it is the coun-
terpart of securities temporarily deposited at the central bank. Money injections thus satisfy
9($!)=7*($!)+7’($!) ¡ 7’($!¡1).
After households have traded with the central bank, they enter the goods market. Here,
they rely on the total amount of money 7($!) ´ 7’($!)+7*($!), i.e., money held under
outright sales/purchases 7’($!) and held under repurchase agreements 7*($!),a n do n
checkable non-interest bearing accounts at a nancial intermediary as means of payment.
11This feature will particularly be helpful to derive the models properties in an analytical way.
6These accounts consist of the individual labor income ,($!)/($!)((&"$!) net the wage outlays
for the own rm ,($!)/($!)
R 1










The modication of the Clower (1967) constraint, i.e., the term in the square brackets, is pri-
marily introduced to avoid the cash-credit good distortion between consumption and leisure.12
Applying a standard cash-in-advance constraint causes the nominal interest rates to distort
the optimal consumption-leisure decision of households. While the main results in this pa-
per are not a¤ected by this distortion, it would exacerbate the intended comparison with
conventional sticky price models, given that the nominal interest rate would then enter the
aggregate supply constraint, i.e., the New Keynesian Phillips curve. The avoidance of this
distortion is in fact responsible for the model to nest the standard New Keynesian model, as
a p p l i e di nC l a r i d ae ta l .( 1 9 9 9 ) .
Households receive cash by selling the wholesale good +(&"$!) to retail rms and retail
rms prots ,($!)
R 1
0 ;(1"$!))1, and have to pay a lump sum tax ,($!)<($!). After the goods
market is closed, inside money 7*($!) is used by the households to repurchase securities
















The main novel feature of the model is that the market for money is assumed to be con-
strained. Considering that asset acquisition of many real world central banks (see Kopcke,
2002), including the US Federal Reserve, is restricted to a set of high credit quality securities,
al e g a lr e s t r i c t i o no no p e nm a r k e to p e r a t i o n si si m p o s e db yw h i c ho n l yg o v e r n m e n tb o n d s
are accepted by the central bank as collateral for money:
5)($!) · 5($!)# (8)
Such a restriction on the asset acquisition of a central bank is commonly justied by the
aim to avoid credit risk in its portfolio and e¤ects on credit allocation (see Meyer, 2001).
It actually imposes an upper bound on the supply of money, given by the discounted value
12This specication closely follows Jeanne (1998).
7of total government bonds held by private sector. In the case where the central bank sets
the interest rate, the legal restriction can be viewed as the main di¤erence between a money
supply regime, as for example applied by the US Federal Reserve in the recent past, and
the so-called real bills doctrine, which was applied by the US Federal Reserve during the
Great Depression and is characterized by an e¤ectively unlimited quantity of money (see
Friedman and Schwartz, 1963). According to this doctrine, the nominal interest rate is held
at its target,13 while money is supplied in exchange for short-term commercial bills that are
intended to nance real transactions and can, thus, rise in a potentially unbounded way.
It is further assumed that households are aware of the fact that their access to cash
is restricted by their holdings of government bonds. This restriction would be irrelevant
when they can issue private debt with an interest rate not higher than the interest rate on
government bonds. However, as the monetary authority (directly or indirectly) controls the
latter, a positive spread 8(($!) 38 ($!) cannot generally be ruled out, so that the households
internalize the constraint (8), which can rewritten as
7*($!)+7’($!) ¡ 7’($!¡1) · 5($!):8($!)" (9)
when they derive their optimal decisions. Maximizing (2) subject to the constraints for
goods market (6), the asset market (7), the money market (9), a non-negativity constraint





,=1 8(($!+,)¡1 ¸ 0, for a given initial value of total nomi-
nal wealth 4($0) 3 0 leads to the following rst order conditions for consumption, leisure,








































where ?($!)=,($!):,($!¡1) denotes the rate of ination, = the shadow price of wealth, > the
13See McCallum (1986) for the relation between an interest rate peg and the real bills doctrine, and for
further references.
8Lagrange multiplier on the goods market constraint (6), and @ the Lagrange multiplier on the
money market constraint (9). The equations (14) and (15) give the rst order conditions for
7* and 7’, respectively, and the multiplier A measures if money is held under repurchase
agreements. The households optimum is further characterized by the constraints (6), (7),
and (9),














where B($!) ´ 5($!):,($!) and C($!) ´ 7($!):,($!), and the no-Ponzi game condition
holding with equality, which provides the transversality condition.
Retailer There is a monopolistically competitive retail sector with a continuum of retail
rms indexed with 1 2 [0"1]. Each retail rm, owned by the households, buys a quantity
++(&"$!) of the wholesale good produced by household & at price ,$($!). To minimize dis-
tortions induced by liquidity constraints, it is assumed that households buy coupons for the
di¤erentiated consumption goods providing retail r m sw i t hc a s h ,w h i c ht h e yu s et ot h ep u r -
chase the wholesale good. We assume that a retailer is able to di¤erentiate the wholesale
good without further costs. The di¤erentiated retail good 0(1"$!)=
R 1
0 ++(&"$!))& is then
sold at a price ,(1"$!). We assume that retailers set their prices according to Calvos (1983)
staggered price setting model. The retailer changes its price when it receives a signal, which
arrives in a given period with probability (1 ¡ D), where D 2 [0"1). A retailer who does not
receive a signal adjusts its price by the steady state aggregate ination rate ?, such that
,(1"$!)=?,(1"$!¡1). A retailer who receives a price change signal in period ! chooses a





, E($!+,"$ !)e ;(1"$!+,"$ !)" (19)
where E($!+1"$ !) ´
.(%!+1)/0(%!+1)
.(%!)/0(%!) %($!+1j$!) denotes the stochastic discount factor and e ;(1"$!+,"$ !)
real prots in period !+F for own prices not being adjusted after period ! : ,($!)e ;(1"$!+,"$ !)=
e ,(1"$!)0(1"$!+,)¡,$($!+,)
R 1
0 ++(&"$!+,))&. Maximizing (19) subject to the demand function
(4), taking the price ,$($!) of the wholesale good, the aggregate nal goods price index ,($!)













, E($!+,"$ !)+($!+,),($!+,)&?(1¡&), " (20)
9where +($!+,) ´
R 1
0 ++(&"$!+,). Using the simple pricing rule for the remaining fraction D
of the rms (,(1"$!)=?,(1"$!¡1)), the price index for the nal good ,! evolves recursively






(1 ¡ D) e ,($!)1¡&, which can be rewritten as:
1=D
¡
??($!)¡1¢1¡& +( 1¡ D)[e ,($!):,($!)]1¡&# (21)
Public sector T h ep u b l i cs e c t o rc o n s i s t so fascal and a monetary authority. The mone-
tary authority supplies money in open market operations in exchange for government bonds
and transfers the seigniorage to the scal authority. The budget constraint of the central
bank is given by





where <) denotes transfers to the scal authority. We consider two monetary policy regimes,
which di¤er with regard to the choice of the operating target being controlled according to
simple rules. The rst regime is characterized by the central bank controlling the supply of
money G($!) ´ 7($!):7($!¡1). In the second regime, which is analyzed in the last part of
the paper, the central bank applies the nominal discount (repo) rate 8($!) as its operating
target.
The scal authority issues risk free one period bonds earning a gross nominal interest rate
8($!), collects lump-sum taxes < from the households, and receives the transfer <) from the
monetary authority:
8($!)5($!¡1)=5($!)+,($!)<)($!)+,($!)<($!)# (22)
Hence, interest rate payments on public debt are the only source of expenditures for the scal
authority. Fiscal policy is assumed to satisfy the following simple rule which relates interest
rate payments on outstanding debt to tax receipts and, for simplicity, to transfers from the
central bank:14
,($!)<($!)=H(8($!) ¡ 1)5($!¡1) ¡ ,($!)<)($!)"H 2 (0"1]. (23)
The scal policy parameter H governs the portion of government expenditures covered by tax
r e c e i p t s . I tt h u ss e r v e sa sam e a s u r ef o rscal responsiveness: A high value of H indicates
scal austerity and H =1a balanced budget regime. Using the scal policy rule (23) to
eliminate taxes in the budget constraint (22) leads to the following rule for the supply of




(1 ¡ H)(8($!) ¡ 1) + 1
¤
5($!¡1)# (24)
Hence, a higher value for the scal policy parameter H reduces the growth rate of government
bonds. In the subsequent analysis we will focus, for convenience, on the case where money
does not serve as a store of value for the households, 7’($!)=0 .A s H30 is assumed
(see 23), it follows immediately from (24) that solvency of the public sector is guaranteed in




,=1 8($!+,)¡1 =0is always satised.
In other words, public policy is Ricardian. It should be noted that this specication of
scal policy contrasts the one, for example, applied in Dupor (2001), where open market
operations are dened as government asset exchanges associated with a constant tax policy
(see also Sargent and Smith, 1987, or Schreft and Smith, 1998), implying that public debt
can rise with the nominal interest rate policy, i.e., that public policy is non-Ricardian.
Equilibrium Given that households are identical, in equilibrium 6($!)=0 , ((&"$!)=(($!),
+(&"$!)=+($!),a n d(#(*"$!)=(($!), and as retail rms behave symmetrically: e ,(1"$!)=
e ,($!), ;(1"$!)=;($!),a n d0(1"$!)=0($!). Market clearing further implies 0($!)=+($!),
0($!)=’($!),a n dI($!)=B($!), where I($!) ´ 4($!):,($!).
Denition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium of the model is a set of sequences f=($!)"
>($!), @($!)"A ($!)"’ ($!)"( ($!)"0 ($!)", ($!), ,$($!), e ,($!), ?($!)"/ ($!)"+ ($!), C’($!)"
C*($!)"B ($!)"8 ($!)"G ($!)g1
!=0 satisfying the aggregate version of the production function
(1), the labor demand condition (3), the households rst order conditions (10)(18) combined
with (6) and (9), the conditions (20), (21), and ?($!)=,($!):,($!¡1) for the evolution of
aggregate prices, the retail goods production, +($!)=0($!), the aggregate resource constraint,
0($!)=’($!),t h escal policy rule (24), and the transversality condition, for a given monetary
policy rule for G($!) or 8($!) and initial values ,($0) 3 0 (if D30)a n d4($0) 3 0.
In what follows we restrict our attention to the cases where the goods market constraint is
binding, ’($!)=C($!). For this, the nominal interest rate on government bonds 8($!) will
be restricted to be larger than one such that >($!) 3 0.
3R e s u l t s
In this section the role of open market operations for short-run macroeconomic e¤ects of
monetary policy is examined. We start by establishing households indi¤erence between
accumulating money or holding money (intratemporally) under repurchase agreements. Using
this property, the remainder of the paper focuses, for analytical convenience, on the case where
money is exclusively held under repurchase agreements. The rst results are then derived for
exible prices. The last part of this section examines the e¤ects of open market operations
11under rigid prices. To lighten the notion, the reference to the state is suppressed in what
follows and J! denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information in period !.
3.1 Money supply via open market operations
In order to adjust holdings of money, which serves in the aggregate as the single means of
payment, households have to engage in open market operations. There, the central bank
supplies an amount of money equal to the discounted value of interest bearing securities,
which are deposited at the central bank. At the end of the period, after the goods market
is closed, households can either repurchase these securities from the central bank or they
can carry over money to the next period, such that the securities are held by the central
bank. The foregone interest by holding money instead of debt exactly equals the additional
cost of money acquisition under repurchase agreements. This property is responsible for
households to be indi¤erent between both types of money holdings, 7’ and 7*.T h i s
result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 (Money holdings) Households are indi¤erent between carrying over money
from one period to the other and holding money intratemporally under repurchase agreements.
Proof. In order to establish the claim in the proposition it has to be shown that the multiplier
A! on the non-negativity constraint 7*
! ¸ 0 is equal to zero. Eliminating the multiplier
>! on the cash constraint (6) in the rst order conditions for money (14) and (15), gives




. Further applying the rst order
condition for private debt (12) and government bonds (13) proofs that A! =0 . ¥
The indi¤erence between the two types of money holdings, measured by the multiplier A!on
the non-negativity constraint 7*
! ¸ 0, critically hinges on the assumption that government
bonds are nominally state contingent. If, on the other hand, it is assumed that their payo¤
in period ! equals 8!¡15!¡1, implying that they are not nominal (though, still real) state
contingent, the multiplier on money holdings under repurchase agreements is in general not
equal to zero. Given that the assumed payo¤ structure induces households to be indi¤erent
between accumulating money or holding money temporarily, A! =0 , the following assumption,
which substantially simplies the analysis as money becomes a ow variable, will be applied
throughout the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 1 Money is exclusively held under repurchase agreements, 7’
! =08!30,
and the initial value of money held by the households is equal to zero, 7’
0 =0 , such that
9! = 7! = 7*
! 8!.
12It will be shown in what follows that the model features two fundamentally di¤erent versions
depending on the relevance of open market operations, i.e., on whether the money market
constraint (9) enters the set of equilibrium conditions as an equality or an inequality. When
open market operations are not legally restricted by (8), such that public and private debt
are eligible, open market operations are obviously irrelevant as money can also be acquired
in exchange for securities, which can be issued by the households. Even if open market
operations are legally restricted by (8), they are irrelevant as long as households government
bonds holdings are su¢ciently large such that 5! ¸ 5)
! always holds. Given the timing of
events in the model, households can a¤ord the latter, if government bonds earn the same
interest as private debt (8! = 8(
!). In this case, households can borrow to invest costlessly in
government bonds to any amount. In contrast, when the interest rate on government bonds
is smaller than the interest rate on private debt, this strategy becomes costly and households
are willing to minimize holdings of government bonds. Due to the existence of the money
market constraint, which reads 7*
! (= 7!) ¸ 5!:8! under assumption 1, a positive spread
8(
! 38 ! can arise in equilibrium, which is associated with a liquidity value of government
bonds, indicated by a positive multiplier @! 3 0. In this case, the money market constraint
(9) is binding, 5! = 5)
!, indicating that households are only willing to hold government bonds
equal to the desired amount of money times the current repo rate, 5! = 8!7!.T h i sr e s u l t
is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 (Legal restriction) The money market constraint is binding, 7! = 5!:8!,
if the interest rate spread between private and public debt is expected to be positive J![8(
!+1 ¡
8!+1] 3 0.
Proof. Given that =! 3 0 is ensured by (10) and (18), the rst order condition (13) implies
that the multiplier @! is strictly positive if J![8(
!+1 ¡ 8!+1] 3 0. Then the complementary
slackness condition (17) demands the open market constraint to hold with equality. ¥
Whether the open market constraint is binding or not has substantial consequences for the de-
termination and the evolution of government bonds, interest rates, money, and consumption.
Suppose that the cash constraint (6) is binding and that the expected spread between the
interest rate on private debt and the interest rate on government bonds is positive. Accord-
ing to the result in proposition 2 the open market constraint then demands that money and,
thus, consumption is linked to real government bonds by ’!8! = 5!:,! a n dr e a lw e a l t hc a n
be determined, as 4! = 5!.15 If, however, the interest rate spread equals zero, 8! = 8(
!,t h e
15It should be noted that an interest rate policy is, in this case, equivalent to a policy regime where the
central bank controls the ratio of money to government bonds, as applied in Schreft and Smiths (1998)
long-run analysis of open market operations.
13money market constraint is not binding and the amount of securities traded in open market
operations 5)
! is not directly linked to public debt. This case corresponds to the conventional
specication of monetary business cycle models, where there is no legal restriction, such that
open market operations and real nancial wealth are irrelevant.
3.2 Money, interest rates, and prices
In this subsection the role of open market operations for the relation of money supply and
interest rates is examined under exible prices. Here, we are primarily interested in the abil-
ity of the model to generate a liquidity e¤ect, i.e., a decline in the money market rate in
response to a monetary injection. While the liquidity e¤ect is commonly found in empirical
contributions (see Eichenbaum, 1992, or Hamilton, 1997), it can hardly be reproduced in
monetary business cycle models, without referring to segmentations or information asymme-
tries in asset markets (see Lucas, 1990, Fuerst, 1992, or Alvarez et al., 2002). In any case,
the success of these strategies to resolve the so-called liquidity puzzle depends on parameter
restrictions that decide on the ability of particular e¤ects, brought about by the asset market
frictions, to dominate the expected ination e¤ect of a monetary injection, that tends to raise
the nominal interest rate. On the contrary, it is shown in this section that an unanticipated
increase in money supply is unambiguously associated with a liquidity e¤ect, when the money
market constraint is binding.
Consider the case where prices are exible, i.e., the probability of a retailer receiving
a price signal is equal to one (D =0 ), and that the central bank exogenously controls the




!¡1 exp(K!), where L 2 [0"1)" (25)
where the innovations K! have an expected value equal to zero and are serially uncorrelated.
It should be noted that the money supply rule is specied in terms of the growth rate to
facilitate comparisons to related studies. Given that money is actually a ow variable in
our model, it might be more intuitive to specify a money supply rule in levels, which would
further simplify the analysis, leaving the main results unchanged.
For the case where prices are exible, the solution for most of the variables can imme-
diately be derived. The real wage rate is constant and equals the inverse of the retailers
markup, /! = ,$
! :,! = &¡1
& , which immediately implies together with ’! = 0! = (! that
consumption is uniquely pinned down by (11) and, thus, constant.16 Further, suppose that
16This property is actually a virtue of avoiding the cash-credit good distortion between consumption and
leisure by applying the modied cash constraint (6).
14the nominal interest rate on government bonds exceeds one, 8! 3 1, implying that the cash
constraint is binding, C! = ’!, and that the rate of ination equals the growth rate of money,
?! = G!. Then the response of the nominal interest rate(s) on a money supply shock, K! 3 0,
critically hinges on whether the open market constraint is binding or not.
When, the interest rate spread is expected to be equal to zero, 8! = 8(
!,t h em o n e y
market constraint is irrelevant, @! =0 . Combining the rst order conditions for money (14)
and (15), which then reads >! =( 8! ¡ 1)=!, for consumption (10) and for bonds (12), gives
the consumption Euler equation
.)! = -8(
!J! [.)!+1:?!+1]# (26)
Given that consumption is constant, the nominal interest rates satisfy 8
(()
! = J!G!+1:-.
Hence, for serially correlated money growth rates, L30, an expansionary money supply
shock leads to a rise in the money market rate, due to the so-called expected ination e¤ect
(see Christiano et al., 1997). If, on the other hand, the money market constraint is binding,
an inverse relation between money supply and the money market rate arises. For a liquidity
e¤ect to occur, it is, however, crucial that scal policy is assumed to be Ricardian, i.e., to
ensure government solvency by satisfying H30.
Suppose that the spread 8(
! ¡8! is positive, implying that the money market constraint is
binding, 7! = 5!:8!. Then the stock of government bonds outstanding relates to the supply
of money and, for a binding goods market constraint, ’! = C!, to consumption expenditures,
B! = ’!8!. Applying the supply rule for government bonds (24), which reads in real terms
?!B! =[ ( 1 ¡ H)8! + H]B!¡1, and using that consumption is constant under exible prices,





Specifying the money supply rule in form of G!+1 = G!+1(G!"K !+1), as in Alvarez et al. (2002)
where money is also not accumulated, would instead lead to a non-backward looking relation,
which might be more intuitive as the nominal interest rate is a jump variable. Nevertheless,
equation (27) reveals that a rise in the money growth rate G! is associated with a decline in
the nominal interest rate 8!, provided that we assumed the scal authority to satisfy H30.
If, however, H =0would be assumed, which implies that scal policy is non-Ricardian, then
a money injection would leave the current interest rate unchanged. A non-zero feedback
from debt to taxes, H30, thus serves as a bound for the supply of eligible securities and is
therefore responsible for the price of money, i.e., the nominal discount rate, to decline when
money supply rises.
15In order to derive the solution for the nominal interest rate, we apply the log-linear
approximation to the model at the steady state. A variable with a bar denotes the particular
steady state value. The steady state is characterized by constant values for ’" ?" I" C" 8("
and 8 given by: .)(’):[¡.-(’)] = 2:(2 ¡ 1)" C = ’" ? = G" and 8( = G:-, regardless whether
the money market constraint is binding or not. Hence, the steady state of the model is always
consistent with the monetary facts of McCandless and Weber (1995).17 If the money market
constraint is binding, @30, the steady state satises
8 =( G ¡ H):(1 ¡ H) and I = ’8# (28)
Otherwise (@ =0 ) ,t h er e p or a t es a t i s es 8 = 8
(. The existence of a steady state with a
binding money market constraint, 8M8
( ) @30, requires the central bank to choose
a small average money growth rate G for its rule (25) and the scal authority to nance a
minimum amount of debt obligations with taxes (see 28). The steady state conditions for
binding constraints in the money and the goods market (831 ) >30), which immediately
follow from the (28) and 8
( = G:-, are presented in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 (Steady state) Suppose that the scal policy is su¢ciently responsive such
that H ¸ 1 ¡ -. Then there exists a steady state with binding constraints in the money and
the goods market if the central bank chooses an average money growth rate G 2 (-"e G),w i t h
e G ´ H:[1 ¡ (1 ¡ H):-] ¸ 1.
It should be noted that the scal policy constraint, H ¸ 1¡-, which is imposed to guarantee
that the upper bound e G is non-negative, is hardly restrictive. The upper (lower) bound on
the average money growth rate ensures the money (goods) market constraint to be binding in
the steady state. Suppose that public policy satises the conditions in proposition 3 and that
the support of K is su¢ciently small such that the money market constraint always binds,
@! 3 0. Then, by log-linearizing (27) at the steady state the fundamental solution of the model
can be shown to be the unique solution according to the criterion of Blanchard and Kahn
(1980). Given that the nominal interest rate is not a predetermined variable, this requires
the di¤erence equation (27) to exhibit an unstable eigenvalue. The fundamental solution for
the log-linearized model with a binding money market and cash constraint then reveals that
an unambiguous liquidity e¤ect arises. The solution for the repo rate for a non-deationary
steady state, G ¸ 1, is presented in the following proposition, where b +! denotes the percentage
deviation of a generic variable + from its steady state value + : b +! ´ (+! ¡ +):+.
17For example, money is always neutral in the long-run.
16Proposition 4 (Liquidity e¤ect) The fundamental solution of the log-linear approxima-
tion to the model at the steady state with @30, 831 and G ¸ 1i st h eu n i q u es o l u t i o na n d
generates a liquidity e¤ect by:
b 8! = ¡(G:H)b G!# (29)
Proof. Log-linearizing (27) at the steady state with @30 and >30,l e a d st ob 8! =
(G:H)b 8!¡1 ¡(G:H)b G!, implying that the eigenvalue is unstable, given that G ¸ H by assump-
tion. As the nominal interest rate is not a predetermined variable, G! is the single state
variable. Hence, the fundamental solution b 8! = ¡(G:H)b G! is the unique solution and predicts
an unambiguous liquidity e¤ect. ¥
Hence, the model is able to generate a liquidity e¤ect if the money market constraint is
binding, whereas the so-called liquidity puzzle arises when open market operations are ir-
relevant. It should, however, be noted that the consumption Euler equation predicts that
the nominal interest rate on private debt rises with the expected ination rate regardless
whether the money market constraint is binding or not. In the latter case both interest rates
are identical, whereas the repo rate behaves inversely in the former case. It will be shown
in the following subsection that the nominal interest rate 8( will also decrease with money
supply when prices are not completely exible.
The fundamental solution for the nominal interest rate given in (29) further implies that
there exists a simple relation between the applied money supply rule (25) and an exogenous
interest rate policy: An interest rate peg is equivalent to a constant money growth policy.
This property leads to the last result in this subsection, which concerns the determination
of the price level. As it is well known, interest rate policy can easily lead to price level
indeterminacy, if it does not react to the state of the economy. In particular, an interest
rate peg is commonly associated with price level indeterminacy if scal policy is assumed to
be Ricardian (see, e.g., Benhabib et al., 2001), as in this model. A constant money growth
rule, however, di¤ers with regards to its determinacy implications, as shown by Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2001, 2003), and provides a nominal anchor facilitating the determination of the
price level. In this model, the existence of a nominal anchor rather depends on wether the
money market constraint is binding or not, than on the type of monetary policy rule. Given
that, an interest rate peg is equivalent to a constant money growth rule for a binding money
market constraint, price level determinacy is always ensured. This result is summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 5 (Price level determinacy) Suppose that the cash constraint is binding and
that the central bank pegs the nominal discount rate 8! = 8. Then the price level is
(in)determined if the money market constraint is (not) binding.
17Proof. Financial wealth is predetermined and satises 40 3 0 and 4! = 5! in equilibrium.
Hence, it evolves, by (24), according to 4! = N!40, where N ´ (1¡H)8+H30.W h e n@! =0 ,
an interest rate peg xes the ination rate by ? = 8- and the growth rate of real nancial
wealth is given by I!:I!¡1 = N:(8-). Its current period real value and, thus, the price level
can, however, not be determined. For @! 3 0 ) C! = I!:8 and C! = ’!,r e a lw e a l t he q u a l s
I! = I = 8’, such that the price level is uniquely determined by: ,! = 4!:I! = N!40:(’8).
¥
The reason why the price level can be determined when the money market constraint binds
relies on the property that government bonds provide liquidity services through open market
operations, which allows to determine the current real value of nancial wealth which is
predetermined in nominal terms.18 Hence, the legal restriction on money supply resolves the
problem of price level indeterminacy, which occurs when the nominal interest rate is pegged
and money supply is unbounded. The latter case can also be interpreted as a monetary
policy regime following the real bills doctrine (see McCallum, 1986). Hence, our nding
corresponds to the results in Sargent and Wallace (1982) and Smith (1988), showing that a
monetary policy under the real bills doctrine leads to indeterminacies of prices and equilibria
in overlapping generations models, whereas legal restrictions on money and credit markets are
able to restore determinacy. As, however, stressed by Sargent and Wallace (1982), a Laissez-
Faire regime can be welfare enhancing, indicating that given that such restrictions, when they
are binding, misallocate resources, it follows that there can be a trade-o¤ between achieving
price level stability and achieving e¢cient resource allocation through credit markets (see
Wallace, 1983). In our model with exible prices, consumption and leisure are constant and
identical for both cases, implying that an equilibrium with a legal restriction regime is not
Pareto-dominated. This property, which does not necessary apply to the case where prices
are rigid, will, however, not further be examined in this paper.
3.3 Monetary policy under staggered price setting
In order to extend the previous analysis for the case where prices are exible, we assume
in this section that prices are set in a staggered way, D30, in accordance with numerous
contributions to the recent monetary policy literature (see e.g. Clarida et al. 1999, or
Woodford, 2003). On the one hand, the responses to a monetary policy shock should be more
realistic than for exible prices. One the other hand, we expect the properties regarding the
price level determination (see proposition 5) to carry over to the determinacy of real variables
18This mechanism relates to the result in Canzoneri et al. (2000), where price level indeterminacy is resolved
by assuming that government bonds directly enter a cash-in-advance constraint.
18and, thus, of the rational expectations equilibrium if prices are not completely exible. The
model then additionally features an aggregate supply constraint stemming from the partial
price adjustments of retailers. Log-linearizing (20) and (21), the evolution of the ination
rate can be summarized by the following constraint, i.e., the so-called New Keynesian Phillips
curve:19 b ?! = Oc C’! + -J!b ?!+1, where O ´ (1 ¡ D)(1 ¡ -D)D¡1 3 0 and C’! = ,$
! :,!(= /!)
denotes the retailers real marginal costs. The equilibrium of the log-linear approximation
to the model at a steady state with 831, P ´¡ .):(.))’) 3 0" and Q ´ .-:(.--() 3 0,f o r
the monetary policy rule (29) with G ¸ 0,w h i c hc a nf o r@! 3 0 either be interpreted as an
exogenous rule for the nominal interest rate or the money growth rate, is dened as follows.
Denition 2 A rational expectations equilibrium of the log-linear approximation to the sticky
price model at the steady state with P, Q30, 831,a n dG ¸ 0 is a set of sequences {b ’!" b C!,
b ?!" b 8!" b I!}1
!=0 satisfying (29), b C! = b ’!,
b ’! =
(
b I! ¡ b 8! if @! 3 0
J!b ’!+1 ¡ (b 8! ¡ J!b ?!+1):P if @! =0
" (30)
b ?! =-J!b ?!+1 + R1b ’!" (31)
b I! =b I!¡1 + R2 b 8! ¡ b ?! if @! 3 0" (32)
where R1 ´ O(P + Q) 3 0, R2 ´ (G ¡ H):G 2 [0"1), and the transversality condition for a
given initial value I0 = 40:,0 3 0.
The equilibrium conditions listed in Denition 2 reveal that real nancial wealth, i.e., the
real value of government bonds outstanding, only a¤ects consumption and ina t i o ni nt h e
case where open market operations matter (@! 3 0). Otherwise (@! =0 ), the equilibrium
sequences of consumption, ination, real balances, and the nominal interest rate are com-
pletely una¤ected by real wealth, since they can already be determined by (29)-(31). The
model, given by (30)-(31) and a Taylor-rule instead of (29), is in fact isomorphic to the New
Keynesian models, as for example applied in Clarida et al. (1999) or in Woodford (2003).
The public nancing decision, which is represented by the feedback parameter H governing
the ratio of tax to debt nancing, is therefore irrelevant implying that Ricardian equivalence
applies. As the model with @! =0is characterized by a real bond (wealth) indeterminacy
(see Canzoneri and Diba, 2000), condition (32) is then irrelevant for the equilibrium.
In what follows the e¤ects to a monetary policy shock K!, where b G! = Lb G!¡1 + K!,a r e
examined for the version with a binding money market constraint, @! 3 0, given in Denition
2. In this case, b G! 3 0 measures a money injection associated with an immediate decline in
19See, for example, Yun (1996) for the derivation of this constraint.
19the nominal discount rate, given that (29) provides the fundamental solution for the nominal
discount rate regardless whether prices are sticky or exible.20 This version of the model
exhibits exactly one relevant predetermined variable, namely, real nancial wealth I!¡1 =
4!¡1:,!¡1, such that the state space is given by $! =( b I!¡1"b G!)0. Hence, the fundamental
solution for b I!, b ?!, b ’!(= b C!), b 8!,a n db 8(
! takes the form
S! = D$!" (33)
where S! =( b I!"b ?!"b ’!" b 8!" b 8(
!)0 and D is a 5£2 matrix with elements T2%. The characteristic
polynomial of the model with b @! 3 0 reveals that there exists exactly one stable eigenvalue,
given by T3 ´ T33, indicating saddle path stability. Hence, the unique determination of
t h ep r i c el e v e lf o rt h ec a s ew h e r ep r i c e sa r eexible (see proposition 5) carries over to the
uniqueness of the rational expectations equilibrium path converging to the steady state for
the case where prices are sticky.21 As a consequence, the fundamental (minimum state)
solution (33) is the unique solution of the model. The following proposition summarizes this
result and presents sign restrictions for the coe¢cients in D (see 33).
Proposition 6 (Fundamental solution) The fundamental solution of the model given in
Denition 2 with @! 3 0 is the unique solution and is characterized by (i) Ub ’!:Ub G! 3 0; (ii)
Ub ?!:Ub G! 3 0 ( H3H ,w h e r eH ´ 1 ¡ -R1:(1 ¡ T3 + R1) M 1; (iii) Ub I!:Ub I!¡1 = T3 2 (0"1)
and Ub I!:Ub G! = T34 M 0;( i v )U b 8!:Ub G! = T*4 M 0;a n d( v )U b 8(
!:Ub G! = ¡(P ¡ 1)(1 ¡ T3)T34+
PT*4.
Proof. See Appendix A.
According to the properties of the fundamental solution presented in proposition 6, the
models predictions about monetary policy e¤ects on real activity and prices qualitatively
accord to evidence from vector autoregressions, as presented in Christiano et al. (1999). To
be more precise, part (i) of proposition 6 predicts that consumption (output) and real bal-
ances decline in response to a monetary contraction, b G! M 0, whereas part (ii) reveals that
the price reaction is not unambiguous. For ination to decline in response to a monetary
contraction, the degree of scal responsiveness should be su¢ciently large, H3H . For exam-
ple, the parameter values - =0 #99, D =0 #75" and P = Q =3lead to H ' 0#5.O t h e r w i s e ,t h e
associated rise in the nominal interest rate on government bonds (see part (iv)), can cause
the treasury to increase nominal debt. A stationary sequence of public debt would then
require the ination rate to rise in the future to deate public debt. As retailers set their
20This result is due to the property that one can solve for the nominal discount rate without referring to
the aggregate supply constraint (31) if the money market constraint is binding.
21This property is discussed in detail when contingent interest rate rules are considered (see proposition 7).
20prices in a forward looking way, ination would then also rise in the impact period. Hence,
a small value for the feedback of debt on taxes, HMH , provides an alternative explanation
for an inverse price response to a monetary policy shock, which is commonly found in vector
autoregressions, and known as the price-puzzle (see Sims, 1991).
The model further predicts that real wealth rises in response to a monetary contraction
(see part (iii) of proposition 6), which is mainly caused by the rise in the repo rate due to
the existence of the liquidity e¤ect (see part (iv)). Regarding the return on private debt,
part (v) of proposition 6 also discloses that b 8(
! rises in response to a monetary contraction if
the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution 1:P is su¢ciently large. Moreover,
the solutions for b 8! and b 8(
! reveal that the spread, b 8(
! ¡ b 8!,r i s e si f(P ¡ 1)(1 ¡ T3)T34 3 0,
which is ensured for risk-averse households, P31. Given that only government bonds can be
exchanged for money in open market operations, this spread can be interpreted as a liquidity
premium and behaves in an intuitive way: A decline in money supply raises the willingness of
risk-averse households to liquidate their securities, such that the liquidity value of government
bonds and, thus, the premium on private debt rises.
Corollary 1 A binding money market constraint is associated with an endogenous liquidity
premium if households are risk-avers.
For the last part of this section, the central bank is assumed to endogenously adjust the
nominal discount rate. In particular, interest rate setting is considered to depend on the
realizations of the current ination rate
b 8! = L5b ?!" where L5 ¸ 0, (34)
which is commonly assumed in recent studies on the determinacy properties of interest rate
policy (see Benhabib et al., 2001, 2002, Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2001, or Dupor, 2001), and can
be viewed as a simplied version of the rule proposed by Taylor (1993). As prices are rigid,
stabilization of ination rates is in fact a welfare enhancing policy strategy (see Woodford,
2003), which implies that the ination elasticity L5 should be positive, if scal policy is
su¢ciently responsive, H3H . Otherwise, a rise in the nominal interest rate intended to
stabilize ination can cause the opposite, as shown in part (ii) of proposition 6. Hence, a
binding money market constraint gives rise to an interaction of scal and monetary policy
such that an optimal policy analysis might to be more challenging in this environment.22
In this paper, however, we do not aim to assess the implications of the legal restriction for
22For example, the average distortion brought about by price stickiness implies an optimal long-run gross
ination rate equal to one (see Woodford, 2003). This might, however, be incompatible with a binding money
market constraint, depending on the prevailing scal policy regime (see proposition 3).
21households welfare and continue with the analysis of the local dynamic properties. While
an interest rate peg was shown to ensure to saddle path stability (see proposition 6), the
same property is not guaranteed for the case where the nominal interest rate is set highly
reactive to changes in ination. In particular, the upper bound for an ination elasticity,
which ensures saddle path stability, depends on the scal responsiveness, measured by the
feedback parameter H of the tax rule (23). The determinacy properties are summarized in
the following proposition.
Proposition 7 (Real determinacy) Suppose that the central bank sets the nominal dis-
count rate according to (34). Then the rational expectations equilibrium path of the model
in Denition 2 with a binding money market constraint is (i) uniquely determined, and (ii)
stable if and only if L5 M L5,w h e r eL5 ´ 1+H[(1 ¡ H)8]¡1 3 1#
Proof. See Appendix B.
According to part (i) of proposition 7, the model with a binding money market constraint is
in any case associated with a unique rational expectation equilibrium, including a peg L5 =0 ,
which has already been established in proposition 6. Hence, in contrast to the case where the
money market constraint is not binding, the Taylor-principle (L5 3 1) is neither necessary
nor su¢cient for real determinacy. In the latter case, L5 3 1 avoids a non-fundamentally
induced rise in expected ination to induce a decline in the real interest rate that would
lead to a rise in current consumption and, thus, in ination, which would cause the initial
expectation to become self-fullling (see, e.g., Woodford, 2001). When the money market
constraint is binding, there is another mechanism which rules out sunspot equilibria. A rise
in ination leads in this case to a decrease in real nancial wealth by (32) and, as condition
(30) implies consumption to rise with real wealth, to a decline in aggregate demand given
that the nominal interest rate is non-decreasing in ination (see 34). Hence, the aggregate
demand response tends to lower current ination by the aggregate supply constraint (31),
such that ination expectations cannot be self-fullling.
To get an intuition for the result in part (ii) in proposition 7, consider that the central
bank chooses a high ination elasticity L5 and that ination rises due to a fundamental shock.
If tax policy is highly reactive to the evolution of public debt (high H), then the real value of
public debt will be reduced by higher prices. If, on the other hand, the scal policy regime
nances only a small fraction of its debt obligations by taxes (low H), then the associated
rise in the nominal interest rate 8! can lead to a rise in real public debt. This, however,
corresponds to a rise in the real value of eligible securities held by the households. Thus,
households raise their consumption expenditures, since the increase in public debt eases the
money market constraint. As the rise in aggregate demand further feeds ination by (31)
22the initial inationary impulse is enhanced. Hence, a highly aggressive interest rate policy
might lead to explosive paths when the scal feedback is too small.23 The upper bound L5
given in proposition 7 further reveals that it is su¢cient for saddle path stability if the scal
authority runs a balanced budget policy (H =1) L5 = 1) or if the central bank sets the
nominal interest rate in a passive way (L5 M 1).24
The stability analysis reveals another remarkable property, which regards the relation of
interest rates and money supply. As already shown in proposition 4, there is a simple equiv-
alence principle between interest rates and money supply when the money market constraint
is binding. It predicts, that an interest rate rule (34) is associated with a money growth
rate which is negatively related to current ination. Hence, this monetary policy regime
can equivalently be described by a money supply rule with a negative ination elasticity rule,
Ub G!:Ub ?! = ¡L5H:G, which for example relates to the money growth rule in McCallum (1999).
Accordingly, a central bank can implement a sequence of interest rates satisfying (34), by
supplying money in non-accommodating way, Ub G!:Ub ?! · 0. While this operational proce-
dure, for example, accords to the conduct of monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve (see
Meulendyke, 1998), it cannot be reproduced in the model where the money market constraint
is not binding. In this case (@! =0 ), the relation between interest rates and money supply
is based on the consumption Euler equation (26). In particular, its linearized version in (30)
together with the cash constraint, leads to the following relation between money growth rates
and ination:25
@! =0) Ub G!:Ub ?! =( L5 ¡ 1)P¡1 +1 # (35)
According to (35), an active interest rate setting, L5 3 1, is associated with accommodating
money growth rates Ub G!:Ub ?! 3 0. On the contrary, an interest rate rule which is accompanied
by a non-accommodating money supply, violates the so-called Taylor principle and  as
shown by Woodford (2001) in an isomorphic model  allows for multiple rational expectations
equilibria. This result is summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 8 (Equivalence) A sequence of nominal discount rates satisfying (34) can
only be associated with a sequence of non-accommodating money growth rates Ub G!:Ub ?! · 0
on an unique rational expectations equilibrium path if the money market constraint is binding.
In general, one should expect the money supply of a central bank, which aims at stabilizing
the economy, to exhibit a non-positive feedback from ination (see, e.g., McCallum, 1999).
Such a money supply regime should  for example according to Irelands (2003) estimates for
23See Leith and Wren-Lewis (2000) for a similar result for a sticky price overlapping generations model.
24Note that a non-Ricardian regime (! =0 ) would also require passiveness ("% # 1) to escape explosiveness.
25It should be noted that a money-in-the-utility function specication leads to a similar relation.
23the US  be associated with money market rates that are negatively related to the ination
rate. For an unrestricted money supply (@! =0 ), a non-accommodating money supply is,
however, associated with nominal interest rates that violate the Taylor-principle, which allows
for sunspot equilibria, and that are even negatively related to ination if households are risk-
averse, P31. Otherwise, an active interest rate policy (L5 3 1), which ensures a saddle path
conguration in this case, implies the supply of nominal balances to be accommodating and
even real balances to grow with ination Ub G!:Ub ?! 3 1 (see 35). Hence, a central bank that
is unwilling to allow for self-fullling expectations and for an accommodating money supply
should impose a legal restriction on eligible securities, if it aims at implementing targets for
the money market rate by supplying reserves via open market operations.
4C o n c l u s i o n
Are open market operations really irrelevant for macroeconomic dynamics, as usually pre-
sumed in recent business cycle theory? In this paper it is shown that, when money is the
counterpart of discounted securities deposited at the central bank, the relevance of open
market operations depends on whether the set of eligible securities is constrained or not.
Following the practice of many central banks, a legal restriction on open market operations
is introduced, by which only government bonds are accepted as collateral. When this money
market constraint is binding, an otherwise standard New Keynesian model exhibits an equi-
librium where non-eligible securities are associated with an endogenous liquidity premium.
Given that scal policy is assumed to be Ricardian such that the supply of eligible securities
is not unbounded, money is inversely related to the nominal discount interest rate and a cash
injection is associated with a liquidity e¤ect.
Besides its potential to resolve the liquidity and the risk-free-rate puzzle, a binding legal
restriction on eligible securities facilitates the unique determination of the price level and the
rational expectation equilibrium for interest rate policies, which are associated with indeter-
minacies when money supply is unrestricted. The reason for this property is that households
nancial wealth (public debt) is relevant, as it serves as a collateral for money, and provides
a nominal anchor that allows to pin down the price level even for an interest rate peg. The
determinacy ndings can, therefore, be viewed as a rationale for central banks to impose a
restriction on eligible securities rather than to follow an asset acquisition policy in the way
recommended by the real bills doctrine, which implies money supply to be e¤ectively unlim-
ited. On the other hand, a policy regime with a binding restriction is likely to be dominated
in terms of welfare by a Laissez-Faire regime, as it potentially leads to a misallocation of
r e s o u r c e s .H e n c e ,t h ei n t r o d u c t i o no ft h em o n e ym a r k e tr e s t r i c t i o nc a nb ea s s o c i a t e dw i t ha
24trade-o¤ between determinacy and optimality. A sensible analysis concerning this trade-o¤,
which is beyond the scope of this paper, might however require a more realistic environment
where price rigidities are not the only macroeconomic distortion.
The analysis further reveals a major di¤erence between both regimes that matters for
the implementation of interest rate targets. In particular, an interest rate rule, which is
aimed to stabilize the economy, implies a non-accommodating money supply only if the legal
restriction is binding, while it is associated with money growth rates that rise with ination
if money supply is unrestricted. Moreover, a central bank that aims at implementing its
money market rate target via the supply of reserves through open market operations relies in
the latter case on its ability to assess the amount of money demanded at the particular real
interest rate, that actually links the operating target with aggregate demand. This, however,
demands the nominal interest rate to be jointly targeted with the ination rate, as implied
by a Taylor-type (1993) interest rate rule. If the central bank, on the other hand, imposes
a legal restriction, a direct relation between money supply and the nominal interest rate
arises, which is only (quantitatively) a¤ected by the outstanding stock of eligible securities.
Hence, the less certain a central bank is about the relation between aggregate demand and
the nominal interest rate, the more it should aim to be in control of the assets in open market
operations.
Appendix A: Proof of proposition 6
In order to examine the eigenvalues of the model with @! 3 0 g i v e ni nD e nition 2, it is




























The characteristic polynomial of M¡1
0 M1 is V(¤) = ¤2 ¡
7+81+1
7 ¤+1
7.G i v e n t h a t V(0)
is equal to 1:- and, therefore, strictly positive and V(1) is negative V(1) = ¡R1:- M 0"
the model exhibits one eigenvalue lying between zero and one, ¤1 2 (0"1) and one unstable
eigenvalue, ¤2 3 1.
As there is only a single stable eigenvalue, the fundamental solution is the unique so-
lution of the model. Using the general form in (33) to replace the endogenous variables in
25the equilibrium equations (30)-(32), leads to the following conditions for the undetermined
coe¢cients T3, T53, T34,a n dT54 in D :
R1T3 + -T53T3 ¡ T53 =0 "T 3 ¡ 1+T53 =0 " (37)
R1T34 + -T53T34 + R1(G:H) ¡ T54 =0 "T 34 + T54 +( G ¡ H):H =0 #
where T3 i st h es i n g l es t a b l ee i g e n v a l u eo ft h em o d e l ,T3 =¤ 1. Rearranging the conditions in
(37), gives the following impact multiplier on ination and real wealth
T54 =[ HR1 +( H ¡ G)(1¡ T3)-]:¡"T 34 = ¡[R1G +( 1¡ -L)(G ¡ H)]:¡ M 0"
where ¡ ´ H[R1 + - (1 ¡ T3)+( 1¡ -L)] 3 0 and T53 =1¡ T3 with T53 2 (0"1). The impact
multiplier on ination, T54, is strictly positive if HR1 +( H ¡ G)(1¡ T3)-30.U s i n gt h a tG
is assumed to be strictly smaller than G ´ H:[1 ¡ (1 ¡ H):-],i tf o l l o w st h a tT54 is strictly
positive if H31 ¡ -R1:(1 ¡ T3 + R1). The coe¢cient T39 is further used together with the
solution for b ’!, b ’! = T3b I!¡1 +( T34 + G:H)b G!, to derive the impact multiplier on consumption
and real balances T)4, which reads
T)4 =[ H(1 ¡ -L)+G- (1 ¡ T3)]:¡ 3 0#
With these solutions and b 8! = T*4b G! = ¡(G:H)b G!, one can determine the response of
the interest rate on private debt b 8(
!, by using with the consumption Euler equation, b ’! =
J!b ’!+1 ¡ (b 8(
! ¡ J!b ?!+1):P. Replacing consumption with the structural relation b ’! = b I! ¡
b 8! and applying the fundamental solution gives b 8(
! = ¡[(P ¡ 1)(1 ¡ T3)T34 + PG:H]b G! +
T3 [P(T3 ¡ 1) + T53]b I!¡1, such that U b 8(
!:Ub G! = ¡[(P ¡ 1)(1 ¡ T3)T34 + PG:H].H e n c e , t h e
interest rate on private debt declines with b G! if and only if (P ¡ 1)(1 ¡ T3)T34 + PG:H 3 0,
which completes the proof of proposition 6. ¥
Appendix B: Proof of proposition 7
When the nominal discount rate is set according to (34), the matrices of the 2 £ 2 model
in (36) are unchanged except for the second column of M1. Its elements are now given by
7
(1:2)
1 =1+R1L5 and 7
(2:2)
1 = R2L5 ¡1. The characteristic polynomial therefore changes to
V(¤) = ¤2 ¡ [(R1L5 +1 )¡ R1 (R2L5 ¡ 1) + -]-¡1¤+( R1L5 +1 )-¡1#
Apparently, V(¤) is strictly positive at S =0 , V(0) = (1 + R1L5):- 3 0.A t¤=1 ,i t ss i g n
depends on L5 : V(1) = R1 (R2L5 ¡ 1):-.I fL5 M 1:R2 = ?:(? ¡ H), the model exhibits one
stable and one unstable eigenvalue, indicating a saddle path conguration. If L5 ¸ 1:R2,
26there are either two stable or two unstable eigenvalues. To discriminate between the two
cases, the slope at ¤=1is considered: V0(1) = -¡1fR1[(R2 ¡ 1)L5 ¡ 1] ¡ (1 ¡ -)g, revealing
that V0(1) M 0,g i v e nt h a tR2 2 [0"1). Thus, both eigenvalues exhibit a real part larger than
one. Therefore, equilibrium indeterminacy cannot occur, while, using ? =( 1¡ H)8 + H,
saddle path stability prevails if and only if L5 M [((1 ¡ H)8 + H]:[(1 ¡ H)8]. ¥
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